Abstract. We study the fundamental Byzantine leader election problem in dynamic networks where the topology can change from round to round and nodes can also experience heavy churn (i.e., nodes can join and leave the network continuously over time). We assume the full information model where the Byzantine nodes have complete knowledge about the entire state of the network at every round (including random choices made by all the nodes), have unbounded computational power and can deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. The churn is controlled by an adversary that has complete knowledge and control over which nodes join and leave and at what times and also may rewire the topology in every round and has unlimited computational power, but is oblivious to the random choices made by the algorithm. Our main contribution is an O(log 3 n) round algorithm that achieves Byzantine leader election under the presence of up to O(n 1/2−ε ) Byzantine nodes (for a small constant ε > 0) and a churn of up to O( √ n/ polylog(n)) nodes per round (where n is the stable network size). The algorithm elects a leader with probability at least 1 − n −Ω(1) and guarantees that it is an honest node with probability at least 1 − n −Ω(1) ; assuming the algorithm succeeds, the leader's identity will be known to a 1 − o(1) fraction of the honest nodes. Our algorithm is fully-distributed, lightweight, and is simple to implement. It is also scalable, as it runs in polylogarithmic (in n) time and requires nodes to send and receive messages of only polylogarithmic size per round. To the best of our knowledge, our algorithm is the first scalable solution for Byzantine leader election in a dynamic network with a high rate of churn; our protocol can also be used to solve Byzantine agreement in a straightforward way. We also show how to implement an (almost-everywhere) public coin with constant bias in a dynamic network with Byzantine nodes and provide a mechanism for enabling honest nodes to store information reliably in the network, which might be of independent interest.
Introduction
Our Main Result. We study Byzantine leader election in dynamic networks where the topology can change from round to round and nodes can also experience heavy churn (i.e., nodes can join and leave the network continuously over time). Our goal is to design a fast distributed algorithm (running in a small number of rounds) that guarantees, despite a relatively large number of Byzantine nodes and high node churn, that an honest node is elected as leader and almost all honest nodes know the identity of this leader.
Before we state our results, we briefly describe the key ingredients of our model here. (Our model is described in detail in Section 1.1, it is similar to the model considered in prior work, e.g., [6, 4, 5] .) We consider a dynamic network as a sparse bounded degree expander graph whose topology -both nodes and edges -can change arbitrarily from round to round and is controlled by an adversary. However, we assume that the total number of nodes in the network is stable. Note that our model is quite general in the sense that we only assume that the topology is an expander 5 at every step; no other special properties are assumed. Indeed, expanders have been used extensively to model dynamic P2P networks in which the expander property is preserved under insertions and deletions of nodes (e.g., [26, 29] ). Since we do not make assumptions on how the topology is preserved, our model is applicable to all such expander-based networks. (We note that various prior work on dynamic network models make similar assumptions on preservation of topological properties -such as connectivity, expansion etc.
-at every step under dynamic edge insertions/deletions -cf. Section 1. The issue of how such properties are preserved are abstracted away from the model, which allows one to focus on the dynamism. Indeed, this abstraction has been a feature of most dynamic models e.g., see the survey of [10] .) Furthermore, our results are applicable to dynamic network models with good expansion where only edges change (and no churn) -such models have been studied extensively in recent years (cf. Section 1).
The number of node changes per round is called the churn rate or churn limit. We consider a churn rate of up to O( √ n/polylog(n)), where n is the stable network size. Furthermore, we assume that a large number of nodes can be Byzantine. We allow up to O(n 1 2 −ε ) Byzantine nodes in any round, where ε > 0 is a small constant. Byzantine nodes (who have unbounded computational power) are "adaptive", in the sense that they know the entire states of all nodes at the beginning of every round and thus can take the current state of the network into account when determining their next action. In each round, an oblivious adversary chooses some O( √ n/polylog(n)) nodes that are replaced by new nodes. The oblivious adversary has complete control over what nodes join and leave and at what time and also may rewire the edges in every round and has unlimited computational power but is oblivious to the random choices of the nodes. (Note that an adaptive churn adversary that knows the current state of all the nodes is not very interesting in the context of leader election, since it can churn out the leader as soon as it is elected.)
Our main contribution is a randomized distributed algorithm that achieves leader election with high probability 6 even under a large number of Byzantine nodes and continuous adversarial churn in a number of rounds that is polylogarithmic in n (where n is the stable network size). In particular, we show the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Main Theorem). Let ε > 0 be any fixed constant. Consider a synchronous dynamic n-node (n is the stable network size) expander network where up to O(n 1 2 −ε ) nodes are Byzantine (who can behave arbitrarily and who have full knowledge of the current network state including past random choices made by other nodes), and suppose that up to O( √ n/ polylog(n)) nodes are subjected to churn per round determined by an oblivious adversary. There exists an algorithm that elects a leader with probability 1 − n −Ω (1) who is known by all except o(n) nodes, and the leader is an honest node with probability 1 − n −Ω (1) . The algorithm runs in O(log 3 n) rounds and uses messages of O(polylog(n)) size.
Our algorithm is the first-known, decentralized Byzantine leader election algorithm in highly dynamic networks. Our algorithm is localized (does not require any global topological knowledge), simple, and easy to implement. It can serve as a building block for implementing other non-trivial distributed coordination tasks in highly dynamic networks with churn. Technical Overview. The main technical challenge that we have to overcome is designing and analyzing distributed algorithms with the presence of Byzantine nodes in networks where both nodes and edges can change by a large amount continuously in each round. The same challenge was present in solving the Byzantine agreement problem in such networks which was addressed in [4] . However, this does not directly solve the leader election problem, since the value that (most of) the honest nodes agree may be a value that was generated by a Byzantine node; using the agreement algorithm in a straightforward way does not give any guarantee that an honest node will be elected as leader. Hence, a more involved approach is needed for Byzantine leader election. We outline key ingredients of our approach here (Sections 2.1 and 2.2 give a more detailed overview).
While Byzantine agreement itself does not directly help, it can be used to generate an almost-everywhere public coin, i.e., an almost fair public coin that is known to most honest nodes. This is the first key ingredient. To the best of our knowledge, we present the first solution to such an almost everywhere (AE) common coin in a highly dynamic network.
Our protocol requires nodes to independently generate "lottery tickets" which are bit strings of certain length. Essentially, a node that has the winning lottery ticket becomes part of the small set of finalists from which a leader will be chosen eventually. However, there is a problem in naively implementing this approach. The Byzantine nodes, who know the current network state including random choices of other nodes, can change location and might lie about their lottery ticket number, thus claiming to be the winner. To overcome this, we implement a verification mechanism that allows the honest nodes to check whether the Byzantine nodes are lying. This mechanism is as follows. Once a node generates its lottery ticket it "stores" it in about √ n (randomly chosen) nodes (exceeding the number of Byzantine nodes by an n ε factor). To verify whether a node is indeed the owner of the lottery ticket that it claims, honest nodes will check with these √ n nodes. This prevents a Byzantine node from falsely claiming a lottery ticket that it did not generate in the first place. We show how such a storage and verification mechanism can be implemented efficiently despite the presence of Byzantine nodes in a dynamic network. The last ingredient of the protocol is an efficient and fault-tolerant mechanism to disseminate the identity of the leader to almost all the honest nodes.
We use random walks as the main tool for communication in our protocol. Previously, flooding techniques proved useful in solving the agreement problem under high churn but without Byzantine nodes [6] . In the presence of Byzantine nodes, however, flooding is less useful as it enables Byzantine nodes to disseminate lots of (corrupting) information along with those sent by honest nodes. On the other hand, if honest nodes use random walks (which are lightweight and local) in their information spreading protocol, the Byzantine nodes are no longer able to congest the network without bound. This proves crucial for getting a scalable protocol that uses only polylogarithmic message sizes per round and finishes in polylogarithmic rounds.
As in [4] , we use random walks to sample tokens (approximately) uniformly at random. All nodes generate tokens (which contain the source node's id) and send those tokens via random walks continuously over time. These random walks, once they "mix" (i.e., reach close to the stationary distribution), reach essentially "random" destinations among a large part of the network. Thus the destination nodes receive a steady stream of tokens from essentially random nodes, thereby allowing them to sample nodes uniformly from the network. While this is easy to establish in a static network, it is no longer true in a dynamic network with Byzantine nodes and adversarial churn -these can cause many random walks to be lost and also introduce bias. The "dynamic random sampling theorem" (cf. Theorem 2) shows that most random walks do mix (despite Byzantine nodes and large adversarial churn) and enables us to communicate efficiently among honest nodes.
Our protocol can tolerate up to O(n 1 2 −ε ) Byzantine nodes (for a small constant ε > 0) and up to O( √ n/ polylog(n)) churn. This is essentially the best that our protocol can handle for two reasons. Our storage and verification mechanism needs to store each lottery ticket in about √ n nodes, and to be scalable in terms of the number of messages generated, it can handle only about √ n nodes (each such node generates a ticket, thus overall there will be about n polylog(n) messages -anything significantly more than this will cause much more congestion). The second reason is that for solving Byzantine agreement, we use a majority rule to progress towards agreement [12, 4] . This majority rule algorithm works as long as the number of Byzantine nodes are bounded by O( √ n). Related Work. There has been a lot of recent work on distributed agreement, byzantine agreement, and fault-tolerant protocols in dynamic networks. We refer to [17, 6, 4, 3] and the references therein for details on these works. Here we restrict ourselves to those works that are most closely related.
There has been significant work in designing peer-to-peer networks that are provably robust to a large number of Byzantine faults [15, 18, 27, 30] . These focus only on robustly enabling storage and retrieval of data items. The problem of achieving almost-everywhere agreement among nodes in P2P networks (modeled as an expander graph) is considered by King et al. in [23] in the context of the leader election problem; essentially, [23] is a sparse (expander) network implementation of the full information protocol of [22] . More specifically, [23] assumes that the adversary corrupts a constant fraction b < 1/3 of the processes that are under its control throughout the run of the algorithm. The protocol of [23] guarantees that with constant probability an uncorrupted leader will be elected and that a 1 − O( 1 log n ) fraction of the uncorrupted processes know this leader. We note that the algorithm of [23] does not work for dynamic networks, in particular, when just the edges are rewired from round to round (while still preserving expander topology). In another recent work [21] , the authors use a spectral technique to "blacklist" malicious nodes leading to faster and more efficient Byzantine agreement in static networks. The idea of blacklisting, unfortunately, won't work in our dynamic network model, since the adversary can change the identities of Byzantine nodes by churning out old ones and introducing new ones (cf. Section 2).
The work of [6] addresses the agreement problem in a dynamic P2P network under an adversarial churn model where the churn rates can be very large, up to linear in the number of nodes in the network. (It also crucially makes use of expander graphs.) This introduced the dynamic model with churn that is used subsequently in other papers ( [3, 4] ), including this paper. However, the algorithms and techniques of [6] will not work under the presence of Byzantine nodes; even one malicious node can foil their algorithms. The work of [3] presented storage and search algorithms for a highly dynamic network that can have churn rate up to n/ polylog n. However, these algorithms do not work in the presence of Byzantine nodes. The random walk approach to dynamic sampling was introduced in this paper and subsequently extended to Byzantine nodes in [4] . [17] presents a solution for maintaining a clustering of the network where each cluster contains more than two thirds honest nodes with high probability in a setting where the size of the network can vary polynomially over time.
The work of [4] presents Byzantine almost-everywhere agreement algorithms that can tolerate the same amount of churn as the present paper, i.e., √ n/ polylog n, but it works even under adaptive churn. For this algorithm, only the "rewiring" adversary, which controls the edges between the adaptively churned nodes, needs to be oblivious -this is needed for the random walk approach to work. We use this algorithm as a key building block for implementing our almost-everywhere common coin. [4] also presented an almost tight (up to polylog n factor) lower bound of Ω( √ n/ polylog n) for the amount of churn that can be tolerated if one requires polylogarithmic round algorithms. This lower bound crucially makes use of the adaptive nature of the churn adversary. It is not clear if the same lower bound holds for the oblivious adversary as considered in this paper.
Expander graphs and spectral properties have been applied extensively to improve the network design and fault-tolerance in distributed computing (cf. [31, 14, 9] ). The work of [26] provides a distributed algorithm for maintaining an expander in the presence of churn with high probability by using Hamiltonian cycles.
In recent years, adversarial models for dynamic networks have been studied extensively by [7, 11, 28, 25] and others; see the recent survey of [10] and the references therein. Unlike many early works on dynamic networks (e.g., [1, 13, 16, 2, 8] ) these recent works do not assume that the network will eventually stabilize and stop changing. On the other hand, we would prefer distributed algorithms to work correctly even if the network is changing continuously over time (as assumed in our paper). The works of [25, 7, 11] study a model in which the communication graph can change completely from one round to another, with the only constraint being that the network is connected at each round ( [25] and [11] also consider a stronger model where the constraint is that the network should be an expander or should have some specific expansion in each round). The model has also been applied to agreement problems in dynamic networks; various versions of coordinated consensus (where all nodes must agree) have been considered in [25] . We note that the model of [24] allows only edge changes from round to round while the nodes remain fixed. The model considered here is more general than the model of [24] , as it captures dynamic settings where edges change and nodes are subjected to churn. It is impossible to solve Byzantine agreement when only assuming the (oblivious) adversary of [24] that keeps the graph connected in each round; for example, a Byzantine node placed at a bottleneck point of the network can forever prevent any reasonable information flow between the two separated parts of the network. For the case where the "edge adversary" of [24] adheres to our expansion and regularity assumption, we can apply our results to this model as well.
Computing Model and Problem Definition
We consider a synchronous dynamic network with Byzantine nodes represented by a graph with a dynamically changing topology (both nodes and edges change) whose nodes execute a distributed algorithm and whose edges represent connectivity in the network. The computation is structured into synchronous rounds, i.e., we assume that nodes run at the same processing speed (and have access to a synchronized clock) and any message that is sent by some node u to its neighbors in some round r 1 will be received by the end of r. The dynamic network is represented by a sequence of graphs
. Nodes might be subjected to churn, which means that in each round, up to C(n) nodes (C(n) ∈ O( √ n/ log k n)) can be replaced by new nodes;
the constant k will be fixed in the analysis. We require that, for all r 0,
Furthermore, we allow the edges to change from round to round, but we assume that each G r is a d-regular expander graph with constant spectral gap. The churn and the evolution of the edges are under the control of an oblivious adversary who has to choose the entire sequence of (G 0 , G 1 , . . . ) in advance. Up to B(n) ∈ O(n α/2 ) nodes can be Byzantine and deviate arbitrarily from the given protocol, where α > 0 is a constant adhering to Equation (1) on Page 8. We say that a node u is honest if u is not a Byzantine node and use V corr to denote the set of honest nodes in the network. Byzantine nodes are "adaptive", in the sense that they know the entire states of all nodes at the beginning of every round and thus can take the current state of the computation into account when determining their next action. This setting is commonly referred to as the full information model. We consider the usual assumption that Byzantine nodes cannot fake their identity, i.e., if a Byzantine node w sends a message to nodes u and v, then both u and v can identify w as the same sender of the message. Note that this does not stop Byzantine nodes from forwarding fake messages on behalf of other nodes as we do not assume any authentication service. We assume, without loss of generality, that the adversary only subjects honest nodes to churn, i.e., Byzantine nodes remain in the network permanently. (The analysis of our algorithms can be extended easily to the case where Byzantine nodes are subject to churn as well).
We assume that if a node u enters the network at some later round r, then u knows the number of rounds that have passed since the start of the computation. Any information about the network at large is only learned through the messages that node u receives and u has no a priori knowledge about who its neighbors will be in the future.
We now describe the sequence of events that occur in each round r 1. Firstly, we modify the network G r−1 = (V r−1 , E r−1 ) by subjecting up to C(n) nodes to churn (yielding V r ) and then changing the edge connectivity; recall that these changes are predetermined by the oblivious adversary. At this point, we emphasize that Byzantine nodes are always adaptive in the sense that they can observe the current network state including all past random choices. After the adversary has made its moves, the algorithm operates on the graph G r = (V r , E r ) in round r. Each honest node u becomes aware of its current neighbors in G r , can perform local computation and is able to reliably exchange messages with its neighbors according to the edges in E r . As stated above, our algorithm tolerates O(n α/2 ) Byzantine nodes and churn per round. Let c 1 > 2 be any fixed constant. Our algorithm requires the following condition on α:
We now present the formal definition of the Byzantine leader election problem. Note that since we assume a dynamic network which is a sparse expander in each round, we cannot hope to obtain an algorithm where every honest node eventually knows the leader; for example, the adversary could simply keep churning out all neighbors of a node u, effectively isolating u throughout the run. This motivates us to consider the following "almost everywhere" variant of leader election: Byzantine Leader Election (BLE). Suppose that there are B(n) Byzantine nodes in the network. We say that an algorithm A solves Byzantine Leader Election in T rounds if, in any run of A, there is exactly 1 node u such that (a) all honest nodes terminate in T rounds whp, (b) all except B(n) + o(n) honest nodes accept u as the leader, and (c) node u is honest with probability 1 − B(n) n − o(1). Our leader election algorithm uses an algorithm that achieves Byzantine almost everywhere (BAE) agreement algorithm (cf. [4] ) as a subroutine. We restate the formal definition of the problem here: Byzantine Almost Everywhere (BAE) Agreement. Each honest node v ∈ V 0 has an associated input value from V = {0, 1} and is equipped with a special decision variable dec u (initialized to a neutral state denoted by ⊥). Nodes that are not initially in the network have an arbitrary input value. We say that a node u decides on val when u assigns val ∈ V to its dec u . BAE agreement requires the following in every run: Almost Everywhere Agreement: We say the network has reached almost everywhere agreement by round R on the decision value val
R have decided on the same value val * ∈ V. Validity: If all honest nodes start with val ∈ V, then val is the only admissible decision value for all but O(polylog(n)(B(n) + C(n))) nodes.
The Byzantine Leader Election Algorithm
In this section we present an algorithm for electing a leader in the presence of O(n α/2 / polylog(n)) Byzantine nodes and churn. Before presenting the details of our algorithm, we first discuss why more straightforward approaches do not work: At a first glance, it appears as if we might be able to simply use the Byzantine almost everywhere agreement (BAE) algorithm of [4] to elect a leader. For example, running bitwise BAE agreement on the node ids will inevitably yield almost everywhere agreement on some specific node id. (After agreeing on the i-th bit v, we only consider nodes as candidates whose id has v as the i-th bit.) This, however, is poised to fail, since the adversary will simply choose the initial node ids in a way such that the BAE algorithm yields a decision on an id of a Byzantine node.
An immediate but insufficient improvement of the above approach is to initially instruct each honest node to generate a random id, and then run bitwise BAE agreement on these random ids to elect a leader. In this case, the oblivious adversary, who has to choose the churn and the initial nodes in advance, has no advantage in making an initial guess on the elected id. Byzantine nodes, on the other hand, have full knowledge of the current network state including past random choices in the full-information model. Thus, a Byzantine node u that announces an initially chosen value id u , can adaptively lie about the actual value of id u as soon as the outcome of the agreement algorithm becomes apparent, and subsequently claim leadership. Of course, if the network topology was static, the neighbors of u will notice that u has changed its initial value and could simply inform the remaining network to blacklist u as being malicious. In our model, however, the adversary has the power to rewire the topology over time and to subject nodes to churn, possibly causing all initial neighbors of u to be several hops away from u (or even churned out) during later rounds. This makes it difficult for an honest node v to conclude whether u has deviated from its initial choice, if u and v were not neighbors initially. In fact, any information that v has learned about u while not being a neighbor of u was learned indirectly via other nodes. As we neither assume an authentication service nor make any assumptions on how Byzantine nodes are distributed in the network, an easy indistinguishibility argument shows that v has no way of knowing if the learned information was injected by other Byzantine nodes.
Preliminaries and Technical Tools
We first describe some tools and technical machinery that our algorithm relies on.
Chernoff Bounds. Let X 1 , . . . , X n be independent Poisson trials and let
Random Walk Implementation. To ensure lightweight communication costs, our algorithm relies on random walks as a means of communication. We now describe a simple token-passing implementation of random walks in our model (cf. [3, 4] ): When an honest node u initiates a random walk, it generates a token with its id, a counter initialized to the length of the walk, and possibly attaches some piece of information of O(log n) size. This token is then forwarded to a (current) neighbor of u chosen uniformly at random, which in turn forwards the token and so forth. The counter is decreased by 1 each time the token is forwarded, until it reaches 0, which marks the final destination of this walk. Since Byzantine nodes can deviate arbitrarily from this protocol, honest nodes only forward tokens that are legit, which means that they adhere to above described data format. In particular, an honest node ignores all received tokens whose counter violates the initial counter value according to the algorithm. Our algorithm requires nodes to initiate h log n random walks simultaneously, for a sufficiently large constant h. During the run of the algorithm, an honest node u might receive a large number of tokens (possibly generated by Byzantine nodes). More precisely, the random walks that arrive at a node u are placed in a FIFO buffer according to the order of their arrival. To prevent Byzantine nodes from congesting the entire network with fake tokens, node u forwards up to h log n of the tokens from its buffer in each step. This ensures (whp) passage of random walks that matter to us.
Our algorithm employs a technical result that shows almost uniform mixing for most random walks in our dynamic network. Its proof relies on the combination of several technical results and is related to Theorem 1 of [4] ; we defer the details to Section 3 and focus on the new aspects of our leader election algorithm in the remainder of this section. Intuitively speaking, Theorem 2 says that there is a large set Core of honest nodes such that, after walking for Θ(log n) steps, tokens originating from these nodes have probability of ≈ 1/n to be at any node in Core.
It is important to keep in mind that, since the size of Core is only guaranteed to be n − o(n), there is a nonzero probability for such a token to end up at nodes that are not in Core; for example, by being forwarded to a Byzantine node.
Theorem 2 (Dynamic Random Sampling). Let T = Θ(log 2 n) and consider a dynamic n-node expander network G under an oblivious adversary, and suppose that at most O(n α/2 ) nodes are Byzantine and at most O( √ n/ log k n) nodes are subjected to churn in each round, where k is a sufficiently large constant and for any fixed constant α < 1. Then, there exists a set of honest nodes Core of size n − O( √ n/ log k−6 n) such that, in every time interval [iT + 1, (i + 1)T ] for 0 i Θ(log n) the following hold: 1. A random walk token originating from a node in Core has probability in [
] to terminate at any particular node in Core.
At most O(
√ n/ log k−8 n) nodes in Core receive tokens that did not originate in Core, and n − O( √ n/ log k−9 n) nodes in Core only receive tokens that took all their steps among nodes in Core.
Byzantine Almost-Everywhere Agreement. The following BAE agreement algorithm is given in [4] : Each honest node initially starts with an input bit (either 0 or 1) and instances of the random walk implementation by generating tokens that contain its input bit. Once such an instance is complete (after Θ(log 2 n) rounds), each honest node tries to update its current input value with the majority value of the triple consisting of its input value and 2 of its received tokens. In particular, it follows from the analysis in [4] that Θ(log n) repetitions suffice to converge to almost-everywhere agreement among all except O( √ n/ log k−6 n) nodes with high probability.
The following result lower bounds the number of nodes that agree in all instances when we run Θ(log n) instances of this BAE agreement algorithm in parallel.
(This is what we do when flipping the common coin in Phase 3 of our algorithm for choosing the winning lottery ticket.) Corollary 1 (Parallel BAE agreement, follows from [4] ). Let T = Θ(log 3 n) and suppose that at most O(n α/2 ) nodes are Byzantine, while up to O( √ n/ log k n) nodes are subjected to churn in any round, for any constant α < 1. Suppose that the honest nodes execute Θ(log n) parallel instances of the BAE algorithm of [4] . Then, with high probability, there is a set Agr ⊆ 0 r T V r of honest nodes such that in each BAE agreement instance i (1 i ), all nodes in Agr decide on a common bit b i within T = Θ(log 3 n) rounds, and |Agr| = n − O( √ n/ log k−7 n).
Good and Bad Nodes. For convenience, we define Bad r = V r \ (Agr ∪ Core); that is, Bad r is of size O( √ n/ log k−7 n), contains all Byzantine nodes, and all honest nodes that are in the network in round r and that are either not part of our Core set given by Theorem 2 or decided wrongly in at least one of the parallel BAE agreement algorithm instances. We also define the set Good = Agr ∩ Core.
A Byzantine Leader Election Algorithm
We now describe the details of our leader election algorithm (see Algorithm 4.1 for the full pseudo code) and provide some intuition for its correctness. Phase 1. Determining Candidates: To keep the overall message complexity per node polylogarithmic, we first subsample a set of candidates Cand, by instructing each node to randomly choose to become a candidate with probability 8 log n/ √ n. Our algorithm heavily depends on the sampling capabilities provided by Theorem 2. Recall that the churn and the changes of the communication links are chosen obliviously (cf. Section 1.1), while Byzantine nodes can adapt their behavior by taking into account the current network state. Intuitively speaking, the following lemma shows that the Byzantine nodes have no influence over which honest nodes end up in the set Core, as the Core set is solely determined by the churn and the topology changes, both of which are chosen in advance by the oblivious adversary (cf. Section 1.1):
Lemma 1 (Independence of Core). The membership of nodes in the set Core (as defined in Theorem 2) is independent of the behaviour of the Byzantine nodes.
Proof. We note that the construction of the set Core in the proof of Theorem 2 assumes a run where the Byzantine nodes try to inject the maximum amount of tokens into the network by using all of their available links, with the goal of causing a large amount of congestion in the network.
Consider the Core set as defined in Theorem 2 and consider a run where the Byzantine nodes choose to behave differently, e.g., by sending less messages. This cannot increase the expected number of random walk tokens that a node u ∈ Core receives in a single round and hence, if a random walk originating from u only visited honest nodes and could complete its steps in O(log 2 n) rounds when Byzantine nodes caused the maximum congestion, it can a forteriori complete its steps in a run where Byzantine nodes send less messages. Hence the Core set as defined in Theorem 2 contains the same nodes independently of how Byzantine nodes behave.
Observing that each node chooses to become a candidate uniformly at random, it follows by a simple Chernoff bound that |Cand| 4 √ n log n whp. According to Lemma 1, the number of candidates that are in Core cannot be biased by the Byzantine nodes, but depend only on the churn and the topology changes, which are chosen in advance by an oblivious adversary. This motivates us to restrict ourselves to core candidates defined as CCand = Core ∩ Cand ∩ Agr, which are the candidates that agree in all instances of the BAE agreement algorithm (cf. Corollary 1) and are part of the Core set. From Corollary 1, it follows that |Agr| n − o( √ n) and from Theorem 2 we know that |Core| n − O( √ n/ log k−6 n) n − o( √ n). Therefore, the independence of Core from the behaviour of Byzantine nodes implies the following:
Corollary 2 (Number of agreeing core candidates). With high probability, we have |CCand| 2 √ n log n.
Phase 2. Obtaining and storing lottery tickets:
In this phase, we first instruct the candidate nodes to participate in the "leader lottery" by generating tickets. To this end, each candidate generates a lottery ticket represented as a private random bit string of length log n 2 log c1 , where c 1 > 0 is a constant depending on the bias of the "almost everywhere common coin" introduced in Phase 3. Note that all Byzantine nodes can pretend to be candidates and can collude to generate lottery tickets that maximize their chances. Next, we implement a storage mechanism to ensure that this information persists in the network despite the high churn rate and the dynamic topology changes.
Recall that we allow nodes to attach additional information onto their random walk tokens that they generate. Therefore, when referring to some information I communicated by a node v, we mean the additional information (of size O(log n)) that v has piggybacked onto a random walk token message, as described in the random walk implementation (cf. Section 2.1). We say that node u has stored information I in the network, if u has generated I and there exist at least Θ( √ n log n) honest nodes that are witnesses regarding I (cf. Line 5 in Algorithm 4.3). Keep in mind that Byzantine nodes are omniscient regarding the current network state, enabling them to claim to be witnesses for some arbitrary (possibly fake) information.
Since we assume a sparse network with a dynamically changing topology and only allow messages of polylogarithmic size, we cannot leverage techniques commonly used in static networks; in particular, we cannot bind Byzantine nodes to their initial choice by broadcasting this information to all nodes or requiring neighbors to keep track of each other's choices. Instead, we invoke a storage mechanism (cf. Algorithm 4.3), which allows us to keep track of the initial choice of Byzantine nodes.
In more detail, we initiate the following branching process: When an (honest) candidate u invokes store(z), for some ticket z, it generates a random walk of sufficient length and piggybacks z onto the random walk token message. Suppose that the walk has reached only honest nodes and terminated at some honest node v. Node v in turn starts Θ(log n) new random walks, each of which contains z. Each of these walks that reaches only honest nodes will in turn spawn Θ(log n) new random walks and so forth; we repeat this branching process Θ(log n) times. We can think of the branching process as creating a tree having Ω( √ n log n) leafs. Every honest node that corresponds to a leaf of this tree, locally stores z and becomes a witness of ticket z of node u. In the following, we say that u plays ticket z if z has been stored successfully.
Lemma 2.
Suppose that all candidates execute Procedure store(I) (cf. Algorithm 4.3) in parallel. Then, with high probability, each of the core candidate (i.e. set CCand ⊂ Good) is able to play its tickets.
Proof. Suppose that candidate u ∈ CCand executes store(z) for its ticket z. By the description of the storage algorithm, u generates c log n = Θ(log n) random walk tokens ρ 1 , . . . , ρ Θ(log n) , attaches z to each token. Such a token is forwarded τ times, assuming that it neither reaches a Byzantine node nor a node that is subjected to churn. Let L ρ,z,u denote this event that a token ρ generated by u and associated with z terminates at some node v ∈ Core. By assumption, the topology of the graph and the churn is chosen obliviously, hence we observe that P [L z,u,ρ ] = P [L z,u,ρ ] for any tokens ρ, ρ that u generates for ticket z; thus we define p = P [L z,u,ρ ]. Recalling that |Core| n − √ n/ log k−6 n, it follows from Theorem 2 that
Assuming that event L z,u,ρ happens, it follows from the description of the algorithm that v will in turn generate Θ(log n) random walk tokens and attach z to each of them. We can think of this process as a recursive branching process where the newly created tokens are the (1st generation) children of the (0 generation) token ρ. A generation of this process corresponds to an iteration in Algorithm 4.3, while spawning refers to the event that a child token is generated by a node that received a "parent" token in the previous iteration. Let X z,u be the random variable representing the number of tokens z generated by u (in some generation i 0) that end in Core, i.e., X z,u = |{ρ : ρ generated by u for z ∧ L z,u,ρ }| and E [X z,u ] pc log n (c/2) log n. Since the churn and the topology changes are chosen in advance by the oblivious adversary and each of the tokens performs steps independently, it follows that X z,u is a sum of independent random variables. A standard Chernoff bound yields P X z,u c 4 log n 1 − n −c/8 . Thus, with high probability, at the end of the first iteration of Algorithm 4.3, at least (c/4) log n nodes in Core will each generate c log n new random walk tokens that contain ticket z. After ( 1 2 Θ(log n) + log log n)/ log((c/4) log n) iterations, there are Θ( √ n log n) witnesses for ticket z, conditioned on the (high probability) events that each time, at least (c/4) log n of the generated tokens terminate in Core. Since there are O( √ n log n) such branching points in total, we can remove the conditioning and still retain high probability, by choosing c to be a sufficiently large constant.
To see why the congestion caused by these branching processes is manageable in our model where each link has a per-round capacity of O(polylog(n)) bits, we separately argue on the congestion caused by the (honest) core candidates and the congestion due to candidates that are in Bad (including fake candidates that are Byzantine nodes): Observe that we start out with Θ( √ n log n) candidates, which are uniformly at random distributed among the nodes and, in particular, are independently distributed of the network topology due to the adversary being oblivious (cf. Lemma 1). In any iteration of the branching process, each candidate requires at most Θ( √ n log n) new tokens to be spawned on its behalf in the worst case. The nodes responsible for spawning these tokens were selected because of being reached by random walk tokens and thus, by virtue of Theorem 2, are uniformly distributed among Core. Therefore, the expected number of tokens that a node must create on behalf of core candidates (which are not Byzantine) is O(log 2 n) in expectation and, by applying a Chernoff bound, it follows that each node in Core needs to branch off O(log 2 n) new random walks (whp) in the worst case. To bound the congestion caused by a branching process initiated by a (possibly Byzantine) node in Bad it is sufficient to observe that Bad = O( √ n/ log k−7 n). The number of tokens generated by nodes that are not in Good is asymptotically subsumed by the tokens generated on behalf of Θ( √ n log n) core candidates.
To ensure that nodes in Bad (which includes all Byzantine nodes) have a small chance to guess the winning ticket, we upper bound the number of distinct tickets that Byzantine nodes can play:
Lemma 3. Let I be the set of distinct tickets generated by nodes in Bad such that each I ∈ I is stored in the network, i.e., I has Ω( √ n log n) (fake or honest) witnesses. Then |I| ∈ O(n α/2 log 4 n).
Proof. First, observe that Phase 2 consists of the candidates (and possibly all Byzantine nodes) invoking algorithm store(I) in parallel, which runs for Θ(log n) iterations each of which takes Θ(log 2 n) rounds (according to Theorem 2), yielding a total running time of c log 3 n rounds, for some constant c > 0. Next, we observe that the Byzantine nodes are connected to at most d · B(n) = O(n α/2 ) distinct honest nodes in each of these c log 3 n rounds. Moreover, an honest node accepts at most O(log n) tickets a neighboring node. Thus, in the worst case, every Byzantine node is able to create at most d · O(log n) = O(log n) tickets per round that are subsequently forwarded and successfully stored by honest nodes. We can upper bound the number of fake lottery tickets that the Byzantine nodes can inject by dn α/2 log 4 n. Finally, we consider tickets generated by honest nodes in Bad. Since each node becomes candidate independently with probability Θ(log n/ √ n) and the Core set is fixed in advance (cf. Lemma 1), it follows that the number of tickets generated by honest candidates in Bad is O(n 1/4 log n) whp, which is (asymptotically) subsumed by the number of fake tickets.
Phase 3. Running the lottery to determine the winning ticket: While we cannot directly use Byzantine almost everywhere (BAE) agreement to obtain an honest leader with good probability, we will use the time-tested method of employing such an BAE agreement algorithm as a subroutine to obtain an almost-everywhere common coin (cf. Definition 1 below), which is one of the tools used by our algorithm. The goal of this phase is to determine the finalists, i.e., the nodes who generated the winning lottery ticket. To this end, we generate the winning ticket by flipping an almost-everywhere common coin: Definition 1 (Almost Everywhere (AE) Common Coin). Consider an algorithm P where every honest node outputs a bit and let Comm Q be the event that all nodes in a set Q output the same bit value b. If there exist a constant c 1 2 and a set Q of size n − o(n) such that (A) P [Comm Q ] 1 − n −Ω (1) , and (B)
, then we say that P implements an almost everywhere common coin (AE common coin) on set Q and we say that P has bias at most 1/2 − 1/c 1 .
We will now show that the BAE agreement algorithm given by Corollary 1 can be modified to yield such an AE common coin.
Theorem 3 (AE Common Coin). Consider a synchronous dynamic n-node expander network under the control of an oblivious adversary where up to B(n) = O(n α/2 ) nodes are Byzantine, and suppose that up to C(n) = O( √ n/ polylog(n)) nodes are subjected to churn per round. There exists a polylogarithmic messages and time algorithm (cf. Algorithm 4.2) that implements an almost everywhere coin on a set of n − O(B(n) + C(n)) nodes with a bias bounded by a constant c < 1/2.
Proof. First, note that the event Comm Core corresponds to reaching BAE agreement which happens with high probability, according to Corollary 1; this shows Part (A) of Definition 1.
For (B), what remains to be shown is that the adversary cannot bias the common output bit (i.e. decision value) too much. As described above, in the BAE agreement algorithm of [4] nodes update their (tentative) decision estimate by taking the majority bit value of its current value and 2 values from randomly chosen nodes. Intuitively speaking, this process is self-reinforcing in the sense that once a sufficiently large number of honest nodes have adopted a specific bit value b, the adversary can no longer sway the decision to become 1 − b. We now analyze this property formally: We define the imbalance ∆ r in round r as the difference between the number of nodes that currently use b respectively 1 − b. It is shown in [4] (see also the similar result of Lemma 2.4 in [12] ) that an imbalance in favor of bit b of c 2 √ n nodes is sufficient to guarantee a decision on b (whp), where c 2 is a constant. Thus, for showing (B), we need to lower bound the probability
To this end, we assign the initial private coin flip of a node to a random variable which is either −1 or 1, and define X to be the sum of these random variables; note that ∆ 0 = X. Consider the random variable Z = (X − E [X])/Var [X]. According to the central limit theorem, the distribution of Z can be approximated by the normal distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation √ n, for sufficiently large n. Hence it follows by the properties of the normal distribution (see p. 505 in [?] ) that
for some constant c 3 = c 3 (c 2 ). It follows that the bias of the coin is bounded from above by 1/2 − 1/c 3 . This completes the proof of Property (B) of Definition 1.
The honest nodes jointly perform log n/2 log c 1 flips of this AE common coin to yield the winning ticket that will be known to almost all nodes.
Lemma 4. We partition the set of stored tickets into the set CoreTickets of tickets generated by nodes in Good and the set BadTickets, which contains the tickets played by (honest and Byzantine) nodes in Bad. Consider the winning lottery ticket s yielded by the log n 2 log c1 invocations of Algorithm 4.2 (cf. Line 4 of Algorithm 4.1). Then, it holds that (a) P [∀x ∈ BadTickets :
Proof. Part (a): We first bound the size of set BadTickets. From Lemma 3 we know that |BadTickets| ∈ O(n α/2 log 4 n). Now, consider any ticket z generated by some node u ∈ BadTickets and suppose that z is stored in the network. Note that u might either be Byzantine or an honest node that is not in Core ∩ Agr. The Byzantine node u must have correctly guessed all log n/2 log c 1 bits of the winning ticket s when playing its tickets in Phase 2. Observe that s is generated after the storage procedure of Phase 2 is complete; honest nodes no longer accept storage requests, therefore u cannot alter its tickets after the fact. (It is of course possible that other Byzantine nodes pretend to have stored the winning ticket on behalf of u; we will show how to handle this case in Phase 4.) Let N B be the event that none of the tickets in BadTickets is the winning ticket. By Theorem 3, we know that the AE common coin has a bias bounded by 1/2 − 1/c 1 , for a fixed constant c 1 > 2. Thus it follows that P [z = s] Plugging in (1) on Page 8 for α, we get that P [∀z ∈ BadTickets : z = s]
. This completes the proof of Part (a).
For Part (b), we start out by lower bounding the probability of winning for a ticket generated by a candidate in CCand. Let y be a ticket generated by a candidate in CCand. Corollary 2 and Lemma 2 tell us that there are at least 2 √ n log n such tickets whp; let C be the event that this is true. Using Theorem 3,
Thus we have that P [∃y ∈ CoreTickets : y = s | C ] 1 − n −2 and hence (b) follows by removing the conditioning on event C (which happens whp).
Recalling that the bits of the winning ticket comprises exactly the common decision values of the parallel BAE agreement instances, it follows that all nodes in set Agr know the winning ticket. Thus, each u ∈ Agr knows whether it is itself a winner (and thus becomes a finalist) or if it is among one of the Θ( √ n log n) witnesses of the finalist nodes. If so, u adds itself to the set of propagators P v , for finalist v.
Phase 4. The final competition and leader election: In the final phase, one of the finalists must be chosen as the leader despite the fact that Byzantine nodes can behave like finalists and/or witnesses. In particular, we wish to reach a consensus on the finalist f with the smallest id.
We subdivide Phase 4 into log n 2 log log n + Θ(1) sub-phases, each of O(log 2 n)
rounds. Each honest node u samples O(log n) nodes per sub-phase via random walks. During this sampling process, u tries to discover the finalist f with the smallest id. Node u maintains a variable min-id initialised to ∞. During phase 4, the honest nodes will only pass O(log n) random walk tokens per time step. At the start of each sub-phase, every honest node u initiates Θ(log n) random walk tokens: if u is a witness for a ticket, then that ticket and the min-id value are included in the token; the token is blank otherwise 7 . Each random walk must take Θ(log n) random walk steps in order to mix; this can be achieved in O(log 2 n) rounds (cf. Theorem 2). At the end of the sub-phase, each node looks at all the tokens that terminated on it and checks to see if v has an id smaller than its current min-id and, if needed, updates min-id with the smaller id. We now argue that at the end of log n 2 log log n + Θ(1) sampling sub-phases, n − o(n) nodes will have their min-id set to f .
Lemma 5. Let Finalists be the set of all candidates in CCand that played the winning ticket z and assume that z was stored among Ω( √ n log n) honest witnesses. Suppose that f ∈ Finalists is the node with the smallest id in Finalists. Then, by the end of Phase 4, n − o(n) nodes accept f as the leader with probability at least 1 − o(1).
Proof. We make the following assumptions, each of which is true with probability 1 − n −Ω (1) , thus all of them are also collectively true with probability 1 − n −Ω(1) . 1. We assume that no Byzantine node is a finalist. (Note that by Lemma 4 the probability of a Byzantine node becoming a true finalist is at most n −Ω(1) .) 2. The finalist f is in the Core and has successfully stored its winning ticket, i.e., there are Ω( √ n log n) propagators or witnesses in Core at the start of Phase 4 (cf. Lemma 2). We now endeavour to count (or more precisely upper bound) the number of wrong witnesses W i of fake finalists at the end of sub-phase i. From our assumptions, we begin with W 0 n α/2 , which is all the Byzantine nodes. At the end of sub-phase 1, W 1 is at most O(n α/2 + n α/2 log 3 n) because each of the n α/2 Byzantine nodes can spawn at most O(log 3 n) tokens and each such token can potentially produce a wrong witnesses. (Here, we pessimistically assume that any token initiated by a Byzantine node will lead to one wrong witness.) We must note that the non-Byzantine wrong witnesses are honest nodes that wrongly point to some fake finalist, hence they only initiate O(log n) tokens per sub-phase. Thus, at the end of sub-phase 2, (whp) we get
Extending this argument, at the end of sub-phase i, (whp) we get
Similarly, we now lower bound the number of correct witnesses C i of the finalist f at the end or sub-phase i. Note that a correct witness can turn "wrong" if it subsequently receives a sample from a wrong witness or a Byzantine node. However, such a witness is accounted for in our upper bound on W i in Equation 2. In other words, let C i be the number of correct witnesses at the end of sub-phase i when there are no Byzantine nodes (and therefore no wrong witnesses). Then, C i C i − W i . Thus, we focus on lower bounding C i . By assumption C 0 √ n with probability 1 − n −Ω(1) and moreover those √ n nodes are in Core. At the end of sub-phase 1, (whp) C 1 √ n Ω(1 + log n) = √ n Ω(log n). Extending this, we get (whp) C i = √ n Ω(log i n) as long as C i is at most a small fraction of n. Thus, (whp) we get
We now ask: at what value of i will C i reach Θ(n)? A simple calculation will show that the answer is at i * = log n 2 log log n . At that same i * , substituting in
2 log log n log n ) ∈ o(n). Once C i * reaches Θ(n), nodes in the Core will be able to sample correct witnesses with constant probability and thus in O(1) extra sub-phases, all remaining Core nodes (that have not turned into bad witnesses) will become good witnesses. Since the number of bad witnesses is o(n) at the end of sub-phase i * , the extra O(1) sub-phases will not be sufficient for any significant change in the number of wrong witnesses.
Proof of Theorem 1:
We now combine the results of this section to prove our main theorem. First, Lemma 4, implies that with probability 1 − n −Ω(1) , an honest node will be elected as a leader among the n − o(n) nodes that are in Core. Recalling that initially every node has the same probability of becoming a candidate and that we have O( √ n/ polylog(n)) churn per round, implies that the leader remains in the network for at a least polynomial number of rounds with high probability. Moreover, Lemma 5 tells us that all but o(n) honest nodes know the identity of this leader by the end of the algorithm. Since all phases run in O(log 3 n) rounds, the runtime claim of Theorem 1 follows.
Proof of Theorem 2
Before delving into the proof of Theorem 2 we introduce some technical machinery. Our proof will use the relationship between the spectral gap and vertex expansion of a graph: Consider a graph G of n nodes and a set S ⊆ V (G). Let N G (S) be the set of neighbors of the nodes in S in G \ S. The vertex expansion of G is defined as
Theorem 4 (Cheeger Inequality, [?] ). Let G be a d-regular graph with spectral gap 1 − λ and vertex expansion φ, where d is a constant. Then Θ(
In the proof of Theorem 2 we would like to argue that, after removing nodes affected 8 by Byzantine nodes (or churn) in a given round r from our expander G r , the remaining network still contains a subgraph H r of size n − O(B(n) + C(n)) = n − O( √ n/ polylog(n)) that has constant expansion. The intersection of these sets V (H r ) (1 r polylog(n)) will form the basis of the Core set that we construct for Theorem 2. More specifically, we will apply this result to each round r graph G r , for a polylogarithmic number of rounds. This motivates us to extend the interesting result of [9, Theorem 2.1], which states that, upon removing set F of size εn nodes from an n-node network G with constant expansion and constant node degree, there is a subgraph H of size n − ε n contained in the remainder graph G F ⊆ G that itself has constant expansion, where ε and ε > 0 are small constants. Note that we cannot use the result of [9] for our purposes directly, as this would yield a core set of size n−Θ(n), i.e., a loss of Θ(n) nodes in each round, whereas we require the expander component to be of size n − O( √ n/ polylog(n)). The analysis of this result uses a pruning procedure Prune(c) that iteratively removes sets of nodes that have small expansion from the residual graph G F , yielding a sequence of pruned graphs
Thus we prove the following result.
Theorem 5. Let G be a n-node graph with vertex expansion φ and constant node degree d and suppose that all nodes in a set F are removed from G, where |F | = o(n). Then, for any positive constant c < 1, there exists a subgraph H of G such that 1. H has vertex expansion cφ, and 2. |H| n − |F | 1 +
Proof. We adapt the proof of Theorem 2.1 in [9] . Let G F be the graph yielded by removing the set F from G. Perform the following iterative procedure (cf. Algorithm Prune in [9] ): Initialize G 0 = G F . In iteration i 0, let S i be any set of up to |V (G i )|/2 nodes with expansion smaller than cφ. If S i exists, prune S i from G i , i.e., G i+1 = G i \ S i . Let H be graph that we get after the final iteration; note that H has expansion cφ.
We now lower bound the size of H. Suppose that the pruning procedure stops after m iterations. For the sake of a contradiction, suppose that
Define the set S = i=0 S i where is the smallest index such that exactly one of the following two cases holds: First, assume that |S| n/2. Let N Gi (S j ) denote the neighbors in G i \ S j of nodes in set S j . We make use of the following result whose proof follows analogously to Lemma 2.6 of [9] :
Lemma 6 (cf. Lemma 2.6 in [9] ). Suppose that we execute procedure Prune(c).
For all j with 0 j < m, it holds that
Since G has a vertex expansion of φ, it holds that |N G (S)| φ|S|. On the other hand, Lemma 6 implies that |N G F (S)| cφ|S|. Thus we get |F | φ|S| − cφ|S| = φ(1 − c)|S| and hence |S| |F |/(φ(1 − c)), yielding a contradiction. Now, consider the case where |S| > n/2. Then, it follows that
, then |S| n/2 and the first case applies.) Recalling that F = o(n), it follows that S ∈ Θ(n). Since S was removed when executing Prune(c), we know that |N G (S )| cφ|S | and, by the expansion of G, we have |N G (S )| φ|S | as S n/2. Thus
We observe that the size of the neighborhood of S must have been reduced by Θ(n) either due to the removal of nodes in F or because of the pruning of the sets S 0 , . . . , S −1 . This, however, yields a contradiction, since
Thus we have shown that | The following lemma bounds the time that it takes for most random walks to complete their Θ(log n) steps (required for mixing). Its proof follows along the same lines as Lemma 2 in [4] and is hence omitted.
Lemma 7. Suppose that O(n α/2 ) nodes are Byzantine and there is O( √ n/ log k n) churn per round. If each honest node starts h log n random walks of length τ = m log n, for some sufficiently large constant m > 0, then, with high probability, there exists a set N of n − O( √ n/ log k−2 n) honest nodes, such that every token ρ that originated from a node s ∈ N and only reached unaffected nodes, can complete all of its τ = Θ(log n) steps in τ 2 rounds. Moreover, ρ remains no longer than τ rounds at the same node.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2. As a first step, we describe the set Core and bound its size: Let B denote the set of Byzantine nodes together with the set of nodes that are neighbors to a Byzantine node and all nodes that are affected by churn during [1, T log n] rounds. Since, during [1, T log n], a Byzantine node can be connected to at most O(log 3 n) distinct nodes and the total number of churned out nodes is O( √ n/ log k−3 n), it follows therefore that |B | = O( √ n/ log k−3 n). We know from Theorem 5 that, upon removing set B from an n-node network with constant vertex expansion and constant node degree, there is a subgraph of size n − O(|B |) in the remainder graph that itself has constant vertex expansion. We apply this result to every round r ∈ [1, T log n] and denote the resulting expander subgraph by H r . Note that, by Cheeger's inequality (cf. Theorem 4), we know that H r also has constant spectral gap. Let S iT be the set of nodes, such that tokens originating from S in round iT can complete τ steps in T rounds, for 1 i Θ(log n). Lemma 7 tells us that S iT has size n − O( √ n/ log k−2 n), and, by taking a union bound, the set S = Θ(log n) i=1 S iT has size n − O( √ n/ log k−3 n). We define Core = S ∩ T log n r=1
V (H r ) and observe that we get |Core| n − O( √ n/ log k−6 n) with high probability.
Next, we bound the number of tokens that are received by nodes in Core in any particular interval [iT + 1, (i + 1)T ]: Recall that nodes in Core are never adjacent to Byzantine nodes. Thus, any token that is sent across a link of the cut (Core, V \ Core) was sent by a honest node. It follows that (whp) at most O(log 2 n) tokens are sent across any edge during [iT, (i + 1)T ]. The size of the cut (V, V \ Core) in any round r is bounded by d(n − |Core|) and thus at most O( √ n/ log k−7 n) tokens originating from outside Core reach nodes in Core and vice versa.
Recalling that the number of generated tokens inside Core in round iT is |Core|h log n, it follows that hn log n − O( √ n/ log k−8 n) tokens remain among nodes in Core. Since the graph is d-regular and nodes in Core are not adjacent to Byzantine nodes, we know that the expected number of tokens that terminate at any node u ∈ Core ⊆ S iT is h log n. Applying a standard Chernoff bound it follows that at least (h/2) log n and at most 2h log n tokens terminate at u with high probability. This shows that each of at least n − O( √ n/ log k−9 n) nodes in Core are the final destination of Θ(log n) tokens originating from within Core by round (i + 1)T .
Finally, we show that the tokens that remained in Core are almost uniformly distributed on Core after completing their τ steps: For the sake of our analysis, we consider a (virtual) dynamic networkḠ = (Ḡ 0 ,Ḡ 1 , . . . ) that consists of the same honest nodes as G, with the difference that (1) we replace Byzantine nodes by honest nodes, (2) we assume that churn nodes remain in the network, and (3) we assume that E(Ḡ r ) = E(G r ), for all rounds r. In contrast to the actual network G, we assume that edges in the virtual network G have infinite bandwidth. We use the notationv j to refer to the node inḠ that corresponds to v j ∈ G. Recall thatḠ is a sequence of d-regular expander networks determined by the oblivious adversary. Thus it follows from [11] that, after taking τ = Θ(log n) steps, a random walk token is at any particular node inḠ with probability in [ . Note that the above remains true even if we delay the token at every visiting node for some number of rounds, as long as the token takes τ steps in total.
Consider a token ρ (generated in round iT + 1) and suppose that ρ terminated at some node v τ by round (i + 1)T . We define (v 0 , . . . , v τ ) to be the sequence of tokens visited by ρ, where v i ∈ Core. Let (r τ , . . . , r 0 ) denote the sequence of rounds such that ρ is forwarded from v j to v j+1 in round r j , for 0 j τ . In the remainder of the proof, we show that v τ is almost uniformly distributed among the nodes in Core. Consider a tokenρ that terminated at nodev τ in the virtual networkḠ, and suppose that the random sources ofv j ∈Ḡ and v j ∈ G are coupled, for 0 j τ . In round iT , nodev 0 holdsρ and, due to the coupling of the random sources,v 0 forwardsρ to the neighborv 1 (corresponding to v 1 ) in round r 0 . Nodev 1 in turn delaysρ until round r 1 and then forwardsρ to neighbor v 2 and so forth. Hence,ρ takes the exact same sequence of steps inḠ as it does in G. It follows thatρ is almost uniformly distributed among Core, and thus the probability of ρ being at any particular node in Core is in [ 
Conclusion
In this paper, we take a step towards designing secure, robust, and scalable algorithms for large-scale dynamic networks. We presented a scalable and lightweight distributed protocol for the fundamental Byzantine leader election in dynamic networks, tolerating near O( √ n/ polylog(n)) Byzantine nodes and churn per round while using only polylogarithmic amount of messages per node. A key open problem is to show a lower bound that is essentially tight with respect to the amount of Byzantine nodes that can be tolerated, or show a leader election algorithm that can tolerate significantly more Byzantine nodes and churn. The latter might be possible, since we are dealing with an oblivious churn adversary (unlike the adaptive churn adversary of [4] ).
